COLLECTED PLAYS of DANIEL CURZON (Volume VI 1996-1999)
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Nonetheless there are significant numbers of people in Turkey who are resisting, and who struggle for the survival of civility and modern life. And in fact, at present some of them have such heterodox beliefs that their neighbours do not see them as Muslims at all.
There are indications, however, that several of these groups, e. So that, political Islam in Turkey is by and large civilian, especially if we disregard the case of the notorious Kurdish Hizbullah survived also in southeastern of Turkey as a political dynamic used against the separatist Kurds organ the PKK , a shady organization which for years appears to have been largely tolerated, if not actually supported, by the Turkish security apparatus cf. Dorronsoro , The developments in party politics and the reshaping of the media landscape in the s have allowed a plurality of voices to be heard.
Following the uprising, The collapse of the strong state apparatus; the ensuing social, political and economic chaos; and the gradual erosion of Kurdish nationalism as a mobilizing force, all created room for Islamist organizations like IMIK and Rabita to gain social and political influence. In contradistinction to the relatively pluralist character of the public sphere and the political domain in Turkey, the threat or use of armed action and violent methods have been more characteristic and effective political strategies in Iraqi Kurdistan, as have ties of patronage and tribal links.
Iraq has witnessed the reproduction and strengthening of patronage mechanisms, especially in the face of the radical retreat of the state welfare system from the late s onwards. Almost all Kurdish parties in Iraq tend, or are tempted, to monopolize public debate, or at least to co-opt possible sources of dissent.
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In Iraq, it seems, Islamist networks are personalized rather than purely doctrinal; ideological differences, like those over the Gulf War or the attitude towards the United States, may not be wholly irrelevant, but they do seem of secondary importance. Turkey has a very diversified, and largely privatized, public sphere, within which all kinds of debates and rivalries are acted out by non-violent means. It also has its own autonomous Islamist networks, which are largely unrelated to those of the Muslim Brotherhood.
There have been, and are, some contacts between the different Islamic groups. Afghanistan was one cause that united Sunni muslim activists; more recently, Chechnya has been another.
But these isolated, and largely symbolic, causes do not allow us to speak of a unified Sunni internationalist movement. For the most part, the Islamist organizations work within a national framework, and acquire many of the traits that other parties in their respective countries have. They may even have a strongly local character, witness the Islamic Movement of Iraqi Kurdistan, which, following its earlier successes in the entire region, appears to have fallen back on its traditional stronghold, the Halabja area.
Turkey needs a new social contract. Consequently, a deep search has developed for a new social contract in Turkey, with the EU being viewed as the facilitator of this new social contract.
A Bibliography of Studies in Western Languages
The founding principles of this contract should include secularism, the rule of law, and recognition of the multicultural nature of Turkey. Both Kurds and Turks and both secularists and Islamic groups need to be involved in this search for a new social. For Syrian case, Alawites also are seen sometimes as more of a cultural group than a strictly religious one.
The majority of these followers are Alawites, as is President Assad. Although the Alawites are a minority in the country, they have held control over almost all aspects of the government since when the father of Bashar al-Assad took power. The Shiites around the world are mainly supported and funded by Iran, as a counterweight to Saudi Arabia. The Shiites are seen as heretics by many Sunni Islamists, and as such almost all Shias in Syria support the Assad regime, as they somewhat justifiably fear a massacre or even a genocide in revenge should the Sunni groups come to power.
Alawites do not consider the Five Pillars of Islam to be obligatory. As to case in Lebanon and the Palestine, Hizb'Allah was motivated either by internal organisational requirements or in alignment with Syrian and Iranian interests, and mechanisms for the resolution of the hostage-crisis were subject to continuous interaction between Hizb'Allah, Iran, and Syria influenced by internal Lebanese, regional, and international events.
The Western responses to the hostage-crisis showed limited effectiveness as the crisis management techniques were poorly adjusted in timing and direction to the actual crisis environment. The origins of Shi'i Islamism in Lebanon go back not to Iran, as is commonly thought, but to Iraq in the s where a Shi'i religio-political revival took place in the "circles of learning" hawzat al-'ilmiya in Najaf, led by the charismatic Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir as-Sadr. These circles became the epicenter of Shi'i activism and the home base of the Party of Islamic Call Hizb ad-Da'wa al-Islamiya , which propagated a revivalist message calling for a revolutionary transformation of society among Shi'i communities in Iraq, Iran, the Persian Gulf, and Lebanon.
For the Palestine , Two factors have influenced the development of Palestinian identity: Palestinian Diaspora after the war, coupled with Jordanian and Egyptian rule over the West Bank and Gaza.
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It was believed that this step would lead to the reconciliation between "interior" and "exterior" political cultures. Historically, the Palestine question can be related to the problem of Western intervention - cultural penetration in the form of ideas of nationalism and political penetration in the form of colonial rule.
However, while Jewish nationalism originated from the intel1ectual and emotional responses to the pogroms of Eastern Europe and Russia, Arab nationalism was a direct reaction to Ottoman Turkish oppression and European colonialism. Along its historic continuum, Palestine became the object of conflicting political claims and intense religious attachments. In time, these played an important part in the development of two separate but conflicting nationalisms: Arab nationalism and Zionism.
Both forms of nationalism strove to gain control of Palestine. Islamic forces have influenced the politics of Palestinian nationalism throughout its struggle for independence largely by giving it impetus and direction, in confrontation with the Zionists. Regardless of secular tendencies within the Palestinian national movement, the Islamic dimension has been a potent factor in the struggle for independence. It is no wonder then that the religious aspect, i.
Islam, has always been a focal point in the Palestinian political debate and discourse, and has acted as the source 0 checks and balances within the Palestinian polity. The complexity of the conditions which triggered the formation of the Islamic movement led Hamas founders to create an equally complex strategy based on pragmatism and realism in adaptation to the political climate.
Today, the faltering political peace process gives wider support to the Islamic movement spearheaded by Hamas.
It is apparent that a worsening state of affairs arms Hamas with more power, extended from the Palestinian public, to advance its own political agenda within overarching Islamic ideology. During the current Intifada, Hamas garners the support of 30 percent of the Palestinian population. Hamas plays an imperative role in catering to Palestinian socioeconomic and medical needs, let alone the fact that it has a noted presence through its military operations against Israel.
Middle Eastern societies are not a single monolithic mass of people waiting to discover their cultural essence. They are, instead, complex societies consisting of different ideologies, lifestyles and identities — including different ethnic, religious and cultural identities — with competing interests and objectives. Islamist movements participate in national politics and democratic elections, although they neither acknowledge the concept of a nation-state based on a homeland nor the governance of democracy.
They believe that any Muslim is a part of the umma, the nation of Islam. The difference between that and a union, such as the European Union, is that the latter is still based on nation-states with defined geographic homelands coming together under a unified government. The caliphate state that Islamists believe in is not based on citizenry of those who live in a specific territory or a homeland but one that is based on faith.
Historically, nationalism served subjectively by unifying small entities and creating large powerful political units. The growth of unifying sentiments of loyalty toward the nation gave the nation state a strength and a coherence that other forms of political organizations had lacked. In addition, "nationalism tends to differentiate beyond the area which it can unify, increasing'the difficulties of conquest by power.
Yet colonial powers used nationalism in a negative way when they ditched some parts of the mother state and annexed them to different states, where the ditched population became a minority. In such cases, nationalism created domestic problems because it tended to emphasize the minority's problems in any country. Minority problems, however, did create a domestic instability and, as a, result, produced international instability. However, nationalism and the strengthening of the nation state in the nineteenth century were the main reasons for the "Balance of Power" system in the world.
In spite of the importance of nationalism, the variety of conditions and experiences prevented any single definition from being accepted. Thus, a global united definition is still lacking. Arab Nationalism Nationalism is a universal concept. It cannot be divided according to regional considerations Arab, America, British, etc. In addition, its determinant factors are almost the same. Differences between one region and another occur in areap such as historical development and ranking of the determinant factors. According to Arab nationalism, the determinant factors such as language, history, race, and religion need to be discussed.
Historically, Arab nationalism began before the emergence of Islam. The modern Arab nationalism began in the seventeenth century.
In the eighteenth century. However, modern Arab nationalism had three stages of development. The third and contemporary stage of Arab nationalism was the most effective in producing many social and political changes in the Arab world.
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The Iranian claims on some parts of the Gulf and sdme times of all the Gulf constituted a threat to Arab nationalism, on one hand, and to the national interest of the emirates, on the other hand. Finally, the Shah's plans to convert Iran to police the area represented a heavy stick over the heads of the emirates' rulers and people. Thus, the convenient and effective response to all of these variables was the clinging to Arab nationalism and the achieving of the main principles of Arab unity.
The Arab's realization of this nationalistic conflict between Arab nationalism and Persian nationalism emphasized the need for their support of the Gulf emirates. Arabs officially and nonofficia1ly pushed as hard as they could to help those emirates toward an urgent unification as a response to their Arab nationalism. Some examples were. In addition, Oman allowed her citizens to be naturalized by the UAE and allowed them to occupy any official. To conclude , Islamist regimes have been in power for relatively brief periods of time, making longer range judgments more difficult. In Iran we have two decades of dramatically evolving political experience; Sudan has had only one decade; the Taleban in Afghanistan had barely half a decade.
Few regimes of any kind in the Muslim world can demonstrate great signs of success, but they are tolerated in the West as long as their policies are generally not seen as seriously damaging to Western interests. A core problem is the reality that many U. Islamc view of Postmodernizm, The reason lost its hegemony and supra-rational forces came to be accepted. Post-modernism is likely to be characterised by pluralism, be it cultural, religious or literary sphere. Europe and North America became multi-cultural and multi-religious societies due to the migration of people from the western powers' former African and Asian colonies.
Also, it was during this phase that religion also found a respectable place again in western society.
In other words, religion came to be re-appropriated. Thus, post-modernism, unlike modernism, is not hegemonic and is tolerant of other cultures; its main characteristic is pluralism. Now let us explore the relation between Islam and post-modernism. Islam believes in religious and cultural pluralism, and while accepting importance of reason it also accepts supra-rational forces. According to the Quran, Allah has created several religions and cultures though he could have created only one, if He so desired.
Thus, pluralism is the very basic to the Quran.